Modest rebound amidst enduring uncertainty
Growth is set to recover slowly in 2026 from virtual stagnation in 2025. In the wake of the trade war launched by the Trump administration, Mexico’s bet on a growth model built to service the US market and on attracting nearshoring investment is looking like a double-edged sword. USMCA membership has so far granted Mexican exports a strong degree of protection from tariffs (see the exemption on Section 232 tariffs on cars and car parts, and IEEPA tariffs). However, the investment boom experienced in 2022-2023 had been predicated on the assumption of long-term preferential market access to the US. Lifting of uncertainty will depend on how the 2026 USMCA review unfolds. For the moment, investors have reacted with a wait-and-see attitude, reducing since 2023 the level of new FDI flows but increasing reinvestment flows, resulting in broadly stable aggregate. We expect this trend to persist until we get a clearer picture of the long-term situation with the US.
Domestic CAPEX and non-residential investment are expected to recover only weakly, while lower interest rates should support residential investment. Automotive exports declined by 4% YoY in H1 2025. However, electronics exports have taken off to fill the gap, benefiting from the A.I. infrastructure spending boom in the US. If tariffs fail to escalate, exports will have room to grow, as demand from the US is expected to hold. Though the manufacturing sector is shedding workers, the trade/uncertainty shock is showing little evidence of spilling over to the general labour market (unemployment at 3% as at September 2025) and domestic demand. Despite moderating wage growth, stable fiscal transfers and improving consumer confidence should lead to a modest rebound in consumption. Service sector activity should therefore continue posting modest growth. 2026 should be the first year when the effects of the US immigration crackdown become fully visible, creating a downside risk to consumption in the form of weaker remittance flows (3.7% of GDP). Despite somewhat sticky core inflation, the overall context remains disinflationary, and the central bank should continue cutting in the direction of 7%.
External vulnerabilities under control, a challenging return to fiscal discipline
Fiscal deficits like the one that was run in 2024 on the back of pre-election spending send out a worrying signal for a country a mere one downgrade away from losing investment grade status. The Sheinbaum administration was surprisingly successful in achieving fiscal consolidation in 2025, but that progress is expected to stall in 2026. Social transfers will continue to be strongly prioritised, along with infrastructure spending and defence and security. This last category faces the risk of unexpected expenses related to sudden demands from the US government to tighten migratory controls and operations against organised crime. We are skeptical of the government’s assumptions regarding nominal growth, the revenue-raising potential of Mexico’s tariffs on non-FTA countries and measures to improve collection and the capacity to phase-out commitments to the Oil SOE, PEMEX. Hence, the 4.1% of GDP 2026 deficit target seems somewhat optimistic. Given Mexico’s highly volatile external environment, this means a noteworthy – but not imminent – level of fiscal vulnerability. Restoration of a healthy fiscal path will hinge heavily on the success of Plan Mexico, Sheinbaum’s flagship industrial policy plan. The 6-year package aims to incentivise USD 277 billion in foreign investment (automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, electronics, and pharmaceuticals) by 2030, but its heavy reliance on tax incentives means it can lead to cost overshooting. Similarly, it remains to be seen how successful the efforts to restore Pemex’s operational profitability will be. The public oil giant represents a contingent liability on the order of 6% of GDP.
We should continue to see a gradual deepening of the current account deficit, driven mostly by a larger merchandise deficit. Reduced remittance inflows will result in a weakening of the secondary income surplus (3.5% of GDP). Though growth in net FDI inflows (1.5% of GDP) has disappointed, it does not show signs of collapsing, sustained mainly by profit reinvestments. The funding composition of the current account therefore leans stable. FX reserves cover four months of imports, external debt is relatively low (26% of GDP, one-third of it being private sector debt) and its service backed by an IMF flexible credit line arrangement (1.4% of GDP) up for renewal in end-2027.
Business climate under pressure from institutional reforms and trade uncertainty
The leftist Morena party consolidated its rule in the 2024 general elections, securing the presidency with 61% of the popular vote and a de facto supermajority in Congress. President Claudia Sheinbaum succeeds her still-influential mentor, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, and will continue implementing an agenda based on state-led economic development, reducing poverty/inequality through welfare and redistribution, and institutional reforms. Notable among these is the constitutional amendment to elect judges by popular vote, which allowed Morena-aligned magistrates to dominate the June 2025 elections where half the seats were in play. Critics of the reform emphasise the risk of erosion of judicial independence, which may undermine business interests where they conflict with those of public authorities, or create openings for corruption. Similarly, formerly independent regulatory agencies have been placed under the auspices of cabinet members, including the energy, telecoms and competition authorities. The state’s priority role in the energy sector (exploration, processing and distribution, including electricity) will continue to be defended. The pervasiveness of crime is increasingly becoming a business hazard, as it often interferes with everyday operations and forces firms to incur insurance and security costs. Sheinbaum is expected to serve a full mandate, ending in 2030, while all seats in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) will be up for election in 2027. Though her approval ratings have remained high, they have suffered somewhat in the wake of high-profile corruption scandals involving Morena officials. Simmering tensions within the party flare up from time to time but should not escalate into outright faction infighting as long as Sheinbaum’s personal popularity remains strong.
The upcoming USMCA review will be determinant in shaping the business environment in years to come. Our working assumption is that the agreement will survive the 2026 review, though it is harder to say if in the form of a full extension (from 2036 to 2042) or subject to another revision in 2027. Energy sector liberalisation is likely to be a significant point of contention. Despite some overtures to private sector involvement, Morena overall continues to support state dominance at all levels of the energy supply chain, while the US is likely to push for more openness to private foreign capital. Other likely demands such as tighter rules of origin (including higher US content) and more demanding labour standards can erode some of Mexico’s comparative advantages. Under the industrial policy initiative “Plan Mexico”, the government has sought to introduce further nearshoring incentives (amortisation expensing and other tax breaks, national origin requirements for public procurement), but clarification and stabilisation of the US trade relationship will be necessary to meaningfully restore nearshoring momentum. Mexico-China trade will continue to be a casualty of the trade war, as shown by the tariffs introduced in the 2026 budget covering an estimated 8% of imports.

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